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This paper studies how the spouse’s productivity in the labor market affects 
one’s individual earnings when married. Theoretically, the high productivity of 
a spouse in a marriage could affect the other spouse’s earnings in two ways: 
negatively through specialization and division of labor, or positively from 
human capital spillover. Using longitudinal microdata on individuals as both 
single and married people allows us to estimate the spouses’ productivity as a 
single persons and thereby avoid problems of endogeneity between the two 
spouses’ labor market performances. Productivity is approximated with 
residuals from estimates of pre-marriage earnings equations. Results indicate 
that there are negative effects of the spouse’s productivity on individual 
earnings for both males and females, and that this effect appears to be 
enhanced by the duration of the marriage. However, closer examination shows 
that only the youngest groups of males and females experience this negative 
effect. In addition, there is some evidence for a positive effect of the husband’s 
productivity on earnings in the case of older groups of females. 
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Specialization and division of labor between husbands and wives are common 
explanations of monetary gains realized from marriage. According to 
economic theory, the reasons for this are that there are differences in the 
comparative productivity of the spouses and that the productivities of the 
spouses act as substitutes. An alternative to the specialization hypothesis is that 
the productivity of one spouse will increase the other spouse’s human capital 
and productivity. The spouses can assist each other in the labor market, and 
their productivities may be complements. In this paper, we will study how the 
spouse’s productivity, as manifested in earnings in the labor market, affects 
one’s own individual earnings. Will marrying someone who is successful in 
the labor market have a different effect on one’s earnings than marrying 
someone less successful? 
 
Marital matching has implications for the income distribution in society as a 
whole and plays a significant role in the persistence of economic status across 
generations (Chadwick and Solon, 2002). The matching of individuals may 
also have an effect on the distribution of incomes within a marriage as well as 
between males and females. 
 
The degree of specialization depends on the market and domestic productivity 
of the spouses. Both the hours and effort directed towards market and domestic 
work are potentially outcomes of a bargaining and specialization process. Most 
previous studies typically rely on data on earnings and labor force attachment 
during marriage when studying specialization and the division of labor. 
Examples of the questions pursued are, how the earnings of the husband affect 
the wife’s transitions in and out of work (Henz and Sundström, 2001) and the 
amount of time the wife spends at work affects the husband’s earnings (Chun 




the spouse is measured during marriage, it may represent an outcome of the 
specialization process and not a determinant. Findings in previous studies 
indicate that individuals tend to marry as well as be married to others who are 
similar to themselves in terms of earnings and education. (Smith, 1979; Lam, 
1988, and Nakosteen et al., 2004). The former is assortative mating, i.e., the 
matching process of individuals into marriage, where high earners choose to 
marry other high earners. The latter is an outcome of interaction processes 
within a marriage. The question that arises is: If individuals marry others with 
similar earnings potential, will the two spouses reinforce or offset each other as 
a married couple? A test of this requires information on the spouses’ 
productivities before they marry. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that we are able to control for the 
attributes and labor market performance of individuals before they marry, i.e., 
before the potential specialization process has begun. We will use a rich 
register data set, including yearly observations on the entire Swedish 
population over time. This longitudinal data makes it possible to observe the 
individuals and their spouses when they are single and also later on, when they 
are married. The premarital productivity of the spouse will be approximated by 
the differences between the spouse’s actual earnings and the expected 
earnings, given a cross-sectional earnings regression based on observations 
from three years before the marriage. By using information on the individuals 
before they actually meet and form couples, we avoid the problem of 
endogeneity between the spouses’ labor market performance and earnings. 
 
Family life in Sweden, as in most developed countries, has, in the last few 
decades, undergone substantial change, and today women participate in the 
labor market al.,most to the same extent as men.
1 The increase in female labor 
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force participation is an international phenomenon, but, for comparison, 
Sweden has among the highest female labor force participation rates in the 
world.
2 The high share of dual-earner households and the availability of rich 
longitudinal microdata makes Sweden an interesting case to study how the 
choice of partner, i.e., how the partner’s premarital productivity (earnings), 
affects labor market outcomes for both men and women. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section 
presents some theoretical considerations, and Section 3 reviews previous 
studies on marital matching and specialization within marriage. Sections 4 and 
5 present the empirical model and data. The results are reported in Section 6, 
and Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
 
2  Marital Matching and Gains from Marriage 
 
Gains from marriage are in the literature typically attributed to specialization 
and division of labor within a marriage (Becker, 1981). This is based on 
assumptions that rely on differences in productivity and comparative 
advantage. A higher productivity of the spouse in the labor market (ceteris 
paribus) indicates greater advantages of specialization and the division of labor 
as a result of comparative advantage. The degree of specialization depends on 
the spouses’ relative human capital and also on their preferences. As the 
couple begins to specialize, the benefits of specialization will increase, as they 
acquire more specific skills. Becker (1985) shows specialization can occur 
without affecting the working hours of the husband and wife. Housework and 
childcare are tiring compared to leisure and may lead to the individual with 
more housework responsibilities taking less demanding market work, which 
                                                 
2 According to OECD statistics, only Iceland had a higher female labor force participation rate in 




would lead to lower earnings. If the characteristics of the male and female are 
substitutes in the household production function, and if the gains from 
specialization are greater when the difference in the productivity of the spouses 
is greater, then negative assortative mating will be optimal. A marriage market 
that maximizes the sum of marital output will match people with differing 
attributes. With respect to wages, Becker (1973) argues that negative matching 
is optimal. In other words, individuals with high labor market productivity will 
marry individuals with low labor market productivity. 
 
Another possible source of gains from marriage is the sharing of household 
public goods
3. Household public goods are jointly consumed by the spouses 
and can, for instance, be children, nice living spaces, heating, lighting, neat 
gardens and road trips. Lam (1988) extends Becker’s model to include the joint 
consumption of public goods. In Lams model, the gains from marriage come 
from both the joint consumption of household public goods and possibly also 
specialization. If the spouses’ wage elasticity of demand for the household 
public good has the same sign, positive assortative mating with respect to 
earnings is optimal. However, if these goods can be produced at home, gains 
from specialization can be realized and may result in negative assortative 
mating in the optimum. The size of these two effects depends on the 
elasticities of demand for the public good, the cross-wage elasticities of labor 
supply and the level of demand of the public good. If the gains from the 
family’s consumption of the public good offset the gains from specialization, 
the model predicts that high earners will marry each other. Nonetheless, in this 
model, division of labor will still occur, the spouse with higher wage will 
specialize in market work and the spouse with lower wage will specialize in 
home production. Positive assortative mating will be optimal as long as the 
                                                 
3 Other possible monetary gains to marriage are risk sharing and the coordination of investment 
activities (Weiss, 1997). The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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gain from sharing the public good is greater than the comparative advantage 
effect that would occur under negative assortative mating. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is that both spouses can augment the other’s 
productivity. In the workplace, the high productivity of one worker has been 
shown to have a positive effect on the productivity of his/her co-workers (Mas 
and Moretti, 2009). The productivity of the spouses may be complements in 
the labor market, and one or both spouses may be able to benefit from the 
other’s human capital and productivity (See, e.g., Brynin and Francesconi 
2004). Marrying someone who is successful in the labor market may benefit 
one’s own career and increase one’s own earnings. Possible mechanisms for 
this are, e.g., access to larger and more productive networks, the drive and 
ambition of one spouse’s inspiring the other spouse with regard to his/her 
career. Married spouses are also likely to affect each other through values, 
attitudes and the ability/disability to provide inspiration for new ideas and 
opportunities (Benham, 1974). Moreover, it might be the case that a highly 
productive spouse counteracts the depreciation of the partner’s human capital. 
 
 
3 Previous  studies 
 
A number of papers examine the economic processes within marriage, the 
division of labor and specialization within marriage. One strand is the 
literature on the marriage premium, which analyzes whether the positive effect 
on male earnings from marriage arises due to selection or due to specialization. 
The results are mixed; Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) find that the gain from 
marriage is no longer significant when accounting for the selection into 
marriage using an endogenous switching model. Chun and Lee (2001) also use 
switching regression, predicting marital status using the mother’s country of 




selection hypotheses. Korenman and Neumark (1991) use longitudinal data 
and show that the selection effect alone cannot explain the entire gain from 
marriage. More than half of the marriage premium remains after controlling 
for time-invariant unobservable individual attributes that affect both wages and 
marriage. Korenman and Neumark (1991) also show that the marriage 
premium is particularly large during the first five years of marriage. Bardesi 
and Taylor (2008) find large effects of selection on both observable and 
unobservable characteristics in estimates of a fixed-effects model. However, 
after including the time-invariant individual effects, they also find some 
evidence that supports the specialization hypothesis. Ginther et al., (2006) use 
a natural experiment, a reform in the widow pension system, to disentangle the 
marriage premium in Sweden. Their results indicate that the male marriage 
premium can be explained by positive selection into marriage. 
 
For women, the results are more varied. Korenman and Neumark (1992) 
estimate both instrumental variables and fixed-effects models and find that 
marriage does not seem to affect female wages. Hewitt et al., (2002) use 
quantile regression and find no effect of marriage on female wages. Budig and 
England (2001) estimate fixed-effects models and report negative effects on 
female wages. Using a similar approach, Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2004) 
report positive results only for older women. For Swedish women, Ginther et 
al., (2006) find a marriage penalty that the authors argue is due to 
specialization. 
 
If there is an effect of marriage on male and female earnings, it is likely to 
depend on who one marries. In numerous studies, the characteristics of the 
spouse are found to affect individual earnings. The amount of time the wife 
spends at home and the wife’s education are two examples. The educational 
level of the spouse is found to have a positive effect on individual earnings; the 
explanations most often proposed are network effects or human capital The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
 
7
spillover. Among others, the results in Benham (1974) and Jepsen (2005) 
indicate that a higher education of a wife increases her husband’s earnings. 
Rossetti and Tanda (2000), Groothius and Gabriel (2008) and Åström (2009) 
study the relationship between the spouse’s educational level and own earnings 
for both men and women and find positive effects on earnings. 
 
Some studies uses the wife’s labor force attachment, i.e., working hours, as a 
measure of the division of labor and study the effects on the husband’s 
earnings and thereby the degree of specialization. The labor supply and 
earnings during marriage may be affected by the division of labor within the 
couple, the behavior of the partner and the circumstances that characterize life 
as married as well as other exogenous factors that affect both spouses’ 
earnings. Clearly, the wife’s labor hours are endogenous to the husband’s 
earnings.  
 
A common solution to this problem is the use of instrumental variables. 
Instruments proposed include the wife’s characteristics and children (Daniel, 
1992) and the male’s attitude to gender roles and children (Gray, 1997). Both 
of these studies find a negative effect of the wife’s labor hours on the 
husband’s earnings. Another strategy is to use the prediction of the wife’s 
working hours as an instrument, where the wife’s working hours are predicted 
with variables that are assumed to be exogenous to the husband’s earnings. 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) employ this strategy and use children, the age of 
the youngest child, the age of the wife, and the wife's level of education as 
exogenous variables. They find no or little effect of the wife’s working hours 
on the husband’s earnings. However, the presence of children and the age of 
the children may have a direct effect on the husband’s earnings, i.e., they 
might not be exogenous (see, e.g., Cornwell and Rupert, 1997). Chun and Lee 
(2001) use the presence of relatives in the household and the proportion of 




wife’s working hours. Their results are consistent with the specialization 
hypotheses. These studies all use the wife’s attributes within marriage and try 
in different ways to model the endogeneity of the wife’s labor supply, and the 
results rely on the validity of the instruments. The results in these previous 
studies are inconclusive regarding the occurrence of specialization within 
marriage. In the present study, an alternative strategy is used; we use a 
measure of the spouse’s productivity that is observed before the potential 
specialization process has begun. 
 
A few studies have used a similar approach of estimating the individuals’ 
productivity. Brynin and Francesconi (2004) calculate the partner’s, for both 
men and women, “unmeasured productivity” using the residuals from the 
couple’s “education-matching” equation. The unmeasured productivity of the 
individual is approximated with the difference between the partner’s actual and 
expected schooling, given a set of individual characteristics such as one’s own 
education and family background. Brynin and Francesconi find a positive and 
significant effect on the individual’s wage from the partner’s unmeasured 
human capital. Their interpretation is that these unmeasured parts of the 
partner’s human capital enhance the individual’s own stock of human capital 
and thereby his/her wage. The data used only cover the individuals as couples, 
which makes it difficult to separate the estimated effect from selection effects. 
Behrman et al., (1995) also estimate the individual’s unobserved human capital 
for subsequent implementation as a regressor in an earnings equation. They 
calculate the male’s unobservable human capital as the difference between his 
wife’s actual schooling, age and dowry, and her expected schooling, age and 
dowry given the man’s characteristics. This unobserved human capital is used 
as an explanatory variable in his earnings equation, and the results indicate a 
positive and significant effect. The authors argue that the result shows that 
potential wives and employers value the same, for the researcher, unobservable 
attributes. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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To sum up, Becker (1973) argues that an optimal matching of individuals on 
the marriage market is achieved if individuals who are highly productive in the 
labor market marry individuals who are highly productive in domestic work. 
This implies that the labor productivity of the spouse will negatively affect the 
individual’s earnings. However, most empirical studies find that people marry 
or are married to individuals with similar economic attributes; i.e., they engage 
in positive assortative mating. There are also some studies that show that the 
labor market behavior and human capital of one spouse affects the other’s 
earnings. An alternative to the specialization hypothesis is that the productivity 
of one’s spouse in the labor market will increase one’s own human capital and 
productivity. The spouses can assist each other in the labor market, and the 
spouses’ productivity levels may be complements. 
 
 
4 Empirical  strategy 
 
The earnings of an individual can be viewed as an approximation of 
productivity and a measure of human capital. Schooling, age and labor market 
characteristics are some of the factors that are reflected in earnings. Individuals 
marry others of a similar age and with similar education levels, which implies 
that the earnings of husbands’ and wives’ in married couples are likely to be 
correlated. The parts of the spouse’s earnings that are attributed to these and 
other measured factors will be controlled for. In this study, the focus will be on 
how the unexplained part of the spouse’s earnings, i.e., the difference between 
expected and actual earnings, affects one’s own earnings. Having higher 
unexplained earnings implies that the individual is more efficient at exploiting 
his observed characteristics. The unmeasured factors can, for instance, be 
ambition, endurance, social skills, health, intelligence and beauty. Hereafter, 




productivity” or the “spouse’s premarital productivity”
 4. Previous studies that 
use the residuals from a Mincer-equation as a measure of an individual’s 
productivity and ability include Juhn et al., (1993) and Beenstock (2007). At 
least part of these attributes is visible to the potential partners, and previous 
studies show that the characteristics that are attractive to the employer also are 
attractive to potential spouses (Ribar, 2004 and Behrman et al., 1995). Several 
studies on marital matching consider the correlation in earnings residuals as a 
measure of assortative mating (Becker,1981; Nakosteen et al., 2004 and Smith, 
1979). 
 
A crucial feature of this study is that the spouse’s productivity is estimated 
using observations when the individuals are single, i.e., before the two 
individuals form a couple. The earnings during marriage may be affected by 
the division of labor within the couple, the behavior of the partner and of 
circumstances that characterize married life and other exogenous factors that 
affect both spouses’ earnings. In other words; if the spouse’s unexplained 
earnings and productivity are measured during the marriage, they will be 
endogenous to the individual’s own earnings, since both attributes are decided 
simultaneously within the marriage. Productivity observed prior to the 
marriage should not be affected by the "to be" spouse’s attributes or by the 
couple formation itself. To achieve an approximation of the spouse’s 
premarital productivity, we estimate cross-section earnings equations prior to 
the marriage for males and females, respectively. 
 
s s s s x Y ε δ β α + + + = ' ln ,                                                          [ Eq. 1] 
 
                                                 
4 This is a somewhat inadequate term and is rather a reflection of characteristics, unobservable to 
the researcher, that are hypothetically correlated with the productivity. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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where β is a vector of unknown coefficients and xs are explanatory variables 
that according to theory and empirical research are assumed to influence the 
individual’s earnings. δs are the spouse's attributes that affect earnings and are 
unobservable to the researcher but are visible to the employer and the potential 
spouse. εs is the error term. The spouse’s productivity that will be used in step 
two is a generated regressor,  s δ ˆ , and will be approximated with the difference 
between the actual earnings and the expected earnings given the observed 
characteristics and the estimated coefficients from Equation 1. 
 
s s s x b Y ′ − =ln ˆ δ  
 
In a second step, we examine whether the spouse’s premarital productivity is 
systematically correlated with the earnings of the individual in the subsequent 
years as married/cohabitants. The model to be estimated is 
 
it t i it is it is it it it it u D M M M x Y ε γ δ β δ β β β ϕ + + + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ + = ˆ ˆ ln 4 3 2 1 ,                 [Eq. 2] 
 
where Yit are the individual’s i:s earnings at time t, Xit is a vector of explanatory 
variables for individual i at t. Mit is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
individual is married at time t and zero otherwise.  is δˆ
 is individual i’s spouse’s 
productivity prior to marriage, estimated in the first step. The effect of spousal 
premarital productivity is expected to depend on the length of the marriage. 
The variable, Dit, indicating the years of marriage at t, is included as an 
interaction variable with spouse’s premarital productivity to capture this 
potential effect. β1-4 are parameters to be estimated. If specialization occurs, we 
expect the estimated parameters of β3 and β4 to be negative. Given a negative 
sign on β3,  a negative sign on β4 indicates that the effect of specialization 




more specific skills. On the other hand, positive signs on β3 and β4 would 
indicate the opposite; the spouse’s productivity has a positive effect on the 
individual’s earnings, and the positive effect is enhanced with the duration of 
the marriage. This potential result would indicate positive externalities from 
the spouse’s human capital. ui  is a time-invariant individual effect that 
accounts for the individual’s own unobservable characteristics affecting 
productivity, such as intelligence and ability. Equation 2 is estimated using a 
fixed-effects model to account for unobservable time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity.  t γ  is a time-specific effect, and  εit is the error term.
5 The 
variance in the second step will be estimated using the Murphy-Topel
6 
estimator to account for the spouse’s premarital productivity, being a generated 





The data used in this study have been constructed from administrative registers 
kept by Statistics Sweden. Our sample includes individuals born between 1943 
and 1969, who either got married or became cohabitants in 1997. This means 
that the individuals are at least 25 years old when the productivity is estimated 
in 1994. Cohabitating and having children without being married are very 
common and are socially accepted in Sweden.
7 In our data, unmarried 
cohabitant couples are only registered if they have a child in common. The 
empirical strategy in this study relies on the fact that the individuals are 
unmarried when the premarital productivity is measured; therefore, only 
couples where both spouses were single for the three years preceding the 
                                                 
5 For an introduction to panel data models see, e.g., Baltagi (2001) and Greene (2003). 
6 See Murphy and Topel (1985). How to incorporate the estimator to Stata software can be found 
in Hole (2006) and Hardin (2002). 
7 “Marriage” will throughout the study be used synonymously with both formal marriage and 
cohabitation.  The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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marriage are included. This gives a sample of 18,922 couples that were formed 
in 1997. Data is organized as a panel consisting of yearly observations from 
1994 to 2003, i.e., three years prior to marriage and up to the first seven years 
of marriage. 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total annual earnings from 
employment and self-employment. Annual earnings rather than wage must be 
used, as the data do not include information about hours or weeks worked. The 
earnings are deflated using the Swedish Consumer Price Index and are 
expressed in constant year-2000 SEK. The independent variables include 
individual attributes; age, education
8, dummies indicating student status, self-
employment, sector of employment and children present in the household. Age 
and age square are included to control for experience and life cycle effects that 
affect earnings. Education is a measure of the individual’s highest educational 
attainment according to official registers. The dummies indicating the region 
of residence account for regional differences affecting earnings, e.g., labor 
market conditions and commuting options. A dummy indicating students is 
included as an additional control for labor supply. A set of dummy variables 
indicating the sector of employment is included to control for sectorial 
differences in the labor market. Marriage and cohabitation are closely related 
to having children; consequently, indicators for children and parental leave
9 
are included in the set of explanatory variables. Parenthood has been shown to 
have an effect on both male (Cornwell and Rupert, 1997) and female (Budig 
and England, 2001) earnings. 
                                                 
8 The levels of schooling as indicated in the registers of Statistics Sweden are transformed into 
years of schooling in the following way: 7 years for the old compulsory school, 9 years for the 
new compulsory school, 11 years for short upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-
secondary school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 for long university and 19 years for a doctoral 
degree.  
9 Parental benefit is payable for 450 days for children born before 2002 for parents who stay away 
from work to be with a child. Both parents have equal entitlement to the parental benefit days, but 
one parent may give up part of their parental benefit to the other parent. The amount received is a 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics for females and males in 1994 and 1997. 
Females Males 
1994 1997 1994 1997 
Variable  Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev.
Total annual earnings 
(SEK 100)  1327.20 725.62 1266.29 946.71 1807.60 1291.23 2262.3 1455.65
Age  31.28 6.17 34.25 6.14 33.31 6.75 36.22 6.72 
Education (in years)  12.42 1.99 12.50 2.20 12.41 2.15 12.28 2.41 
Children  0.26  0.69  0.04  0.69  
Parental benefit  0.18  0.57  0.08  0.46  
Born in Sweden  0.91  0.91  0.92  0.92  
Self employed  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  
Student  0.13  0.06  0.07  0.04  
Farming  0.006  0.005   0.02    0.01   
Manufacturing  0.11  0.11  0.24  0.24  
Construction  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.10  
Retail  0.21  0.19  0.25  0.25  
Private sector  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.17  
Public sector  0.53  0.50  0.23  0.21  
Stockholm  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.28  
East Middle Sweden  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.15  
Smaland and the islands  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  
South Sweden  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  
West Sweden  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.19  
North Middle Sweden  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
Middle Norrland  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  
Upper Norrland  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  
      
Number of obs.  16,986  16,447  16, 678  16,762 
 
Sample descriptives for males and females with nonzero earnings in 1994 (the 
year in which the premarital productivity is estimated) and 1997 (the first year 
of marriage) can be seen in Table 1. Comparing the means before marriage to 
the means in 1997 for females show that women have lower earnings when 
they are married compared to when they are single. This can partly be 
explained by the incidence of women staying home with young children. In 
1997, 57 percent of the women collect parental benefits compared to 18 
percent in 1994. The mean of earnings for the males demonstrate an opposite 
pattern; their earnings are higher when they are married compared to when The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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they are single. This could possibly be a sign of the well-documented marriage 
premium; for a review on the marriage premium literature, see Ribar (2004). 
Noteworthy is that even though almost 50 percent of the males collect parental 
benefits in 1997, compared to only 8 percent in 1994, their earnings are still 





The first step is to estimate the labor productivity of the spouses before 
marriage. The estimates of Equation 1 are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The estimated residuals from the earnings equations for males and females are 
positively correlated (not reported in the table). In 1994 the correlation in 
earnings residuals between males and females is 0.0854
10 for the entire sample. 
This indicates that high earners tend to marry other high earners, i.e., the data 
show signs of positive assortative mating for earnings. The results of the 
second-step estimations are presented in the Tables 2 and 3. The Hausman 
specification tests are all highly significant in favor of the fixed-effects models 
over specifications with random effects. 
 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 only include controls for education, region of 
residence and age. The estimated coefficient of Husband’s premarital 
productivity is negative and significant. This indicates that higher levels of 
earnings generated by the husband, given his observable characteristics before 
marriage, lead to lower earnings generated by the wife during marriage. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Nakosteen et al., (2004) also use Swedish data and estimates correlation in earnings residuals 
before marriage. They find a correlation of 0.09 three years prior to marriage for a sample of 




Table 2. Estimates of the earnings equations for females. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Married  -0.534 
(0.007) 


























Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed 
No No Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No Yes 
      
Hausman 900.78  929.87  1934.75  1710.32 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 
Number of observations  153,899 153,899 153,899 153,899 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
If the premarital productivity of the husband is one percent higher, ceteris 
paribus, the female’s earnings will be 3.7 percent lower as married. The theory 
of household specialization implies that the specialization should increase over 
time as the partners acquire more specific skills. In model 2, the interaction 
effect between the husband’s productivity and the length of the marriage is 
accounted for, and the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. A 
greater amount of time spent by the couple as a married couple leads to a 
larger negative effect of the husband’s premarital productivity on the female’s 
earnings. 
 
Model 3 includes control variables for the sector of employment, one’s status 
as a student and self-employment. These variables are related to the 
individual’s labor market attachment and may be affected by the marriage or 
the partner’s characteristics. The estimated coefficients of Husband’s 
productivity and Husband’s productivity*Years married are still negative and 
significant. Model 4 includes indicators for children in the household and 
parental leave. This reduces the coefficients of Husband’s productivity and of The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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the interaction with Years married. This indicates that part of the estimated 
effects in models 1-3 comes from the effect of having children or from that of 
being on parental leave. However, the estimated coefficients are still negative, 
and the coefficient of Husband’s productivity*Years married is significant. 
These estimates imply that there might not be an immediate effect of the 
husband’s premarital productivity; rather, the negative effect evolves over 
years of marriage. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of the earnings equations for males. 




























Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed  No No  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No  No  Yes 
          
Hausman 818.49  962.38  2656.75  2538.2 
Adj R
2 0.54  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Number of observations  158,897  158,897  158,897  158,897 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 gives the estimated coefficients for the males. In model 1, the 
estimated coefficient of the Wife’s premarital productivity in 1994 is negative 
and significant. This suggests that the higher level of unexplained earnings 
generated by the wife before marriage implies lower earnings generated by the 
male during marriage. A one percent increase in the wife’s productivity before 
marriage lowers the husband’s earnings by 1.2 percent. Model 2 includes an 
interaction between the wife’s productivity before marriage and the length of 
marriage in years. The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is 




productivity becomes stronger with the duration of the marriage
11. In models 3 
and 4, which include more control variables, the coefficients of Wife’s 
productivity are still negative but are now only significant at the ten percent 
level. 
 
The dynamics within marriage and the division of labor might differ with 
regard to the spouses’ age. It could possibly depend on different preferences 
between cohorts, life cycle effects such as labor force participation and 
employment. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2004) find that there are gains to 
delaying marriage for women; women who marry later have higher wages. 
They further show that the timing of marriage does not seem to affect the 
wages of men. To analyze the heterogeneity with respect to different positions 
in the life cycle, we have estimated the effect of spousal productivity for 
different age groups. The sample is partitioned by the individual’s age in 1994 
into three groups, and the estimations include the full set of independent 
variables.
12 The premarital productivity of the spouse is, however, based on 
specifications including the entire sample. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for females. The estimated coefficients for the 
youngest group of women, aged 25-34, shows a similar pattern as the results 
presented in Table 2. The coefficient of Husband’s productivity is negative and 
significant in both models. The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable 
with years married is also negative, and the parameter estimate is twice as 




                                                 
11Alternative specifications including controls for the spouse’s characteristics (education, age, 
sector and self-employment) are associated with only marginal changes in results. 
12 The results are robust with respect to using the alternative approach of dividing the sample into 
five-year cohorts. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
 
19
Table 4. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age
group. 
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 































   -0.008
(0.002)
***    0.005 
(0.004) 
     0.019
(0.005)
***
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave. 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Hausman  1499.91 1537.84  225.69  226.72  155.06  152.98 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.45 0.45 0.56 0.56 
Number of obs.  119,132 26,467  8,300 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Women aged 35-44 do not seem to be affected by the premarital productivity 
of their husband. The estimated coefficient of Husband’s productivity is not 
significant; neither is the interaction with Years married. Results for women 
over 45 years old show a different pattern; the coefficient of Husband’s 
productivity is now positive and significant. This suggests that for this group 
of women, higher earnings of the husband before marriage is associated with 
higher earnings of the wife during marriage. When including the interaction 
variable, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that 









Table 5. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group. 
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Married  -0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.008 









Wife’s productivity  -0.014 
(0.004) 
*** -0.006 










married     
-0.002 
(0.001) 




Sector of employment,  
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Hausman  1541.70 1544.98  614.94  442.52  309.25  281.58 
Adj R
2 0.53  0.53  0.58  0.58  0.62  0.62 
Number of obs.  105,872  38,197  14,828 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 5 gives the results for males conditioned on age group. For the youngest 
group of men aged 25-34, the estimated coefficients of Wife’s productivity and 
Wife’s productivity*Years married are very close to the estimates for the entire 
sample (Table 3). The estimated parameters for the two older age groups are 




Two additional robustness checks will be carried out. First, the results will be 
tested with regard to the year of estimating the spouse’s premarital 
productivity. Hitherto, the premarital productivity is estimated using 
observations in 1994, i.e., three years preceding the marriage. In an alternative 
specification, the premarital productivity is instead calculated in 1995. See 
Table A2 for estimation results for equation 1 using observations from 1995.  
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The results from using the spouse’s estimated premarital productivity in 1995 
are presented in Tables A3-A6 in the Appendix. Table A3 gives the estimated 
parameters for the entire sample of females, and the results are similar to those 
presented in Table 2 above. On average, there seems to be a negative effect 
from the husband’s productivity on the female’s earnings. Stratifying the 
sample by age group (Table A4) gives estimates in accordance with the 
previous results. Only the youngest group of women seems to experience a 
negative effect from the premarital productivity of the husband. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficient of the husband’s productivity for the oldest group of 
women is positive and significant, implying that there may be a positive effect. 
 
The estimated effect of the wife’s productivity in 1995 on the male’s earnings, 
presented in Table A5, is similar to the results in Table 3. The coefficients of 
the  Wife’s productivity 1995*Years married are negative and significant. 
However, when adding more control variables, the coefficients of Wife’s 
productivity 1995 become insignificant. The results conditioned on the males’ 
age are also comparable to those above; the negative coefficient of Wife’s 
productivity is only significant for the youngest age group. 
 
It is not possible to observe cohabiting couples without children in common in 
our data. This means that we may, in some cases, fail to observe when the 
couples actually became cohabitants. This could pose a problem, as the 
empirical strategy relies on the individuals being single at the time when the 
premarital productivity is observed. If they are in fact cohabiting, the 
estimation of the spouse’s premarital earnings will be endogenous to the 
individual earnings. To ensure that individuals without children are not already 
cohabiting when we observe them as singles prior to marriage, the sample is 
restricted to couples where the individuals had a registered place of residence 
in different areas three years before marriage. In this case, a geographical 




gives a restricted sample of 10,313 couples; the descriptive statistics for this 
smaller sample can be found in Table A7 the Appendix. Compared to the full 
sample, people not residing in the same geographical area prior to marriage on 
average are older, have lower education and have lower earnings. The 
correlation in earnings residuals for the smaller restricted sample is 0.0794 in 
1994. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the restricted sample of women (Table A8) give 
results very similar to those presented for the full sample. There seem to be 
negative effects for younger women and some signs of positive effects for the 
older age groups. For males, the results are in line with those presented above 
for the full sample; negative effects are only found for the youngest group of 
males. 
 
Overall, the results are fairly robust to changes in sample restrictions and the 






In this paper, the effect of the spouse’s premarital productivity, or the 
unobserved traits assumed to be positively correlated with productivity, on 
individual earnings in marriage is studied. Using longitudinal data from 
Swedish population registers allows the observation of males and females 
before they marry, which is essential in order to identify the effect of 
premarital productivity on earnings in marriage. Theoretically, the 
productivities may be substitutes in the household production function, and 
specialization will occur. Another possibility is that the productivities of The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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spouses are complements in the labor market, which means that the high 
productivity of the spouse will yield positive effects on one’s own earnings. 
 
Generally, the results indicate a negative effect of the spouse’s premarital 
productivity on earnings. In other words, a higher premarital labor market 
productivity of one of the spouses translates to lower earnings of the other 
spouse in marriage. This result holds for both males and females on average. 
Even though the marriage market matches individuals with similar economic 
attributes together, i.e., positive assortative mating on earnings, there is 
evidence of specialization within the marriage. There are also results indicating 
that the negative effect is enhanced by the years spent in marriage. This is in 
line with the specialization hypothesis that predicts that the effect will increase 
as the partners obtain increasingly specific skills.  
 
However, closer examination shows that it is the sample of young men and 
women that are driving the results. Males and females over 35 years of age do 
not seem to be affected negatively by their spouse’s premarital productivity. 
For the women over 45, the results even indicate a positive effect of the 
husband’s productivity. Males over 35 years of age do not seem to be affected 
by their wives’ premarital productivities. The negative results for the younger 
groups of males and females are stable to changes in sample restrictions. A 
possible explanation for differences in results between age groups may be that 
the demands for household work are greater for young couples when starting a 
family and rearing small children. The positive effect of husband’s 
productivity on earnings for women over 45 years old is consistent with the 
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Table A1. Definitions of variables. 
Variable name  Description 
Married  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is married in year t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
Years as married  Number of years married in year t.  
 
Total annual earnings  Total  gross  wage  earnings from employment and self-employment. 
Deflated by the consumer price index to the year-2000 price level. 
 
Age In  years. 
 
Education   The levels of schooling as indicated in the registers of Statistics Sweden 
are transformed into years of schooling in the following way: 7 years for 
the old compulsory school, 9 years for the new compulsory school, 11 
years for short upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-secondary 
school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 for long university and 19 years 
for a doctoral degree.  
 
Children   Dummy equal to one if the individual has children, zero otherwise. 
 
Parental  benefit    Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual receives any parental 
benefit, zero otherwise. Parental benefit is payable for 450 days for 
children born before 2002 to parents who stay away from work to be with 
a child. The parental benefit days are always shared equally between both 
parents, but one parent may give up the parental benefits to the other 
parent. The amount you receive is a function of your annual income.  
 
Sweden   Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is born in Sweden, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Self  employed  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is self-employed, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Farming  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in farming, 
zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in 
manufacturing, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Construction  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in 
construction, zero otherwise.Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Retail  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in retailing, 
zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Private sector  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in the private 
service sector, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 




Table A1 continued 
Variable name  Description 
Public sector  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in the 
public sector, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Stockholm  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Stockholm, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
East Middle Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual residence in East 
Middle Sweden, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Smaland and the islands  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Smaland and 
the islands, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
South Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in South Sweden, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
West Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in West Sweden, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
North Middle Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in North Middle 
Sweden, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Middle Norrland  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Middle 
Norrland, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Upper Norrland  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Upper 
























Table A2. OLS of the spouse’s pre marital earnings equation. 
  Females Males 
  1994 1995  1994  1995 
  Robustness check   Robustness check
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Table A2 continued 
Variable 1994  1995  1994  1995 


















         
R
2  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21
Number  of  observations              
Note I: Also included are dummy variables indicating the country of birth. Note II: t-values in 




Tabell A3. Estimates of the earnings equations for females 























   -0.009
(0.002)





Sector of employment, Student 
and Self-employed  No No Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No Yes 
      
Hausman 957.32  968.28  1933.91  1711.64 
AdjR
2  0.34 0.34 0.35 0.37 
Number of observations  155,536  155,536  155,536  155,536 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 
percent level, respectively. 





Table A4. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age 
group.  
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model2 
Married  -0.419 
(0.009) 


































Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Hausman  1534.17 1552.27  232.67 232.75 156.23  156.58 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.46  0.46  0.56  0.56 
Number of observations  120,803 26,449  8,284 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A5. Estimates of the earnings equations for males. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model4 




























Sector of employment 
Student and Self-employed  No No  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No  Yes 
       
Hausman  875.110 1019.270  2768.530  2602.060 
Adj R
2 0.54  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Number of observations  159,941  159,941  159,941  159,941 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 
percent level, respectively. 




Table A6. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group 
Áge 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
































(0.002)   
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave.  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Hausman  1667.06 1673.07  602.02  716.66 467.90 472.20 
Adj R
2  0.53  0.53 0.58  0.58 0.62 0.62 
Number of 
bi
106,634 38,410 14,897 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 
percent level, respectively. 





Table A7. Descriptive statistics for females and males in 1994 and 1997, 
restricted sample. 
 Females  Males 
 1994  1997  1994  1997 
Variable  Mean  St. Dev. Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St. Dev. Mean  St. Dev.
Total annual 
earnings (SEK 100) 
1282.7 764.9 1236.3  987.1 1808.5 1427.5 2219.9 1652.0 
Age  32.22  6.32 35.23 6.29 34.30  6.89 37.19 6.86 
Education (in years)  12.26  2.03  12.31  2.23  12.29  2.18  12.07  2.43 
Children  0.39  0.71  0.06   0.72  
Parental  benefit   0.28  0.57  0.12   0.44  
Born in Sweden   0.90    0.90    0.90    0.90   
Self  employed  0.01  0.01  0.04   0.05  
Student  0.13  0.07  0.05   0.04  
Farming 0.01    0.005    0.01    0.01   
Manufacturing  0.09  0.10  0.22   0.23  
Construction  0.01  0.01  0.11   0.10  
Retail  0.21  0.19  0.26   0.26  
Private  sector  0.13  0.14  0.15   0.16  
Public  sector  0.55  0.52  0.24   0.21  
Stockholm  0.32  0.32  0.31   0.31  
East  Middle  Sweden  0.15  0.15  0.15   0.15  
Smaland and the 
islands  0.05  0.05  0.05   0.05  
South  Sweden  0.12  0.12  0.13   0.13  
West  Sweden  0.18  0.18  0.18   0.18  
North Middle 
Sweden 
0.08  0.08  0.08   0.08  
Middle  Norrland 0.04  0.04  0.04   0.04  
Upper  Norrland  0.05  0.05  0.05   0.05  
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Table A8. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age
group. Restricted sample 
  Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 







***  -0.226 
(0.018) 
  -0.019 
(0.030) 
  -0.020 
(0.030) 






  -0.028 
(0.021) 
















Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Children and parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
            
Hausman  810.720 833.770 162.620 162.470 -62.20  -66.62 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.46  0.46  0.59  0.59 
Number of observations  57,158 16,960  4,878 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 




Table A9. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group. Restricted sample 
  Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 


























married    
-0.004
(0.002)
**   0.005 
(0.003) 
   -0.004 
(0.005) 
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Children and parental 
leave. 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
           
Hausman  866.590 868.610  396.780  504.530 309.20  303.42 
Adj R
2  0.53  0.53 0.58  0.58 0.61  0.61 
Number of observations  49,096 23,658 9,057 
Note: t-values in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1
percent level, respectively. 